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06 Jan 2012
Axiomatizing core extensions
 Camelia Bejan,
 Juan Camilo Gómez
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We give an axiomatization of the aspiration core on the domain of all TUgames using a relaxed feasibility condition, nonemptiness, individual rationality, and generalized versions of the reduced game property (consistency) and superadditivity. Our axioms also characterize the Ccore (Guesnerie and Oddou, Econ Lett 3(4):301–306, 1979; Sun et al. J Math Econ 44(7–8):853–860, 2008) and the core on appropriate subdomains. The main result of the paper generalizes Peleg’s (J Math Econ 14(2):203–214, 1985) core axiomatization to the entire family of TUgames.
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 Title
 Axiomatizing core extensions
 Journal

International Journal of Game Theory
Volume 41, Issue 4 , pp 885898
 Cover Date
 20121101
 DOI
 10.1007/s0018201103164
 Print ISSN
 00207276
 Online ISSN
 14321270
 Publisher
 SpringerVerlag
 Additional Links
 Topics
 Keywords

 Core extensions
 Axiomatization
 Aspiration core
 Ccore
 Consistency
 C71
 Industry Sectors
 Authors

 Camelia Bejan ^{(1)}
 Juan Camilo Gómez ^{(2)}
 Author Affiliations

 1. Department of Economics, Rice University, 6100 Main Street, Houston, TX, 77005, USA
 2. Business Program, University of Washington, Bothell, 18115 Campus Way NE, Bothell, WA, 98011, USA