International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 40, Issue 3, pp 461–466

A Ramsey bound on stable sets in Jordan pillage games

Authors

  • Manfred Kerber
    • School of Computer ScienceUniversity of Birmingham
    • Department of EconomicsUniversity of Birmingham
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-010-0247-5

Cite this article as:
Kerber, M. & Rowat, C. Int J Game Theory (2011) 40: 461. doi:10.1007/s00182-010-0247-5

Abstract

Jordan (J Econ Theory 131(1):26–44, 2006) defined ‘pillage games’, a class of cooperative games whose dominance operator is represented by a ‘power function’ satisfying coalitional and resource monotonicity axioms. In this environment, he proved that stable sets must be finite. We provide a graph theoretical interpretation of the problem which tightens the finite bound to a Ramsey number. We also prove that the Jordan pillage axioms are independent.

Keywords

PillageCooperative game theoryStable sets

JEL Classification

C71P14

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2010