Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to extend the rights egalitarian solution (Herrero et al. in Math Soc Sci 37:59–77, 1999) to the context of non-transferable utility sharing problems. Such an extension is not unique. Depending on the kind of properties we want to preserve we obtain two different generalizations. One is the “proportional solution”, that corresponds to the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution for surplus sharing problems and the solution in Herrero (Soc Choice Welf 15:113–119, 1998) for rationing problems. The other is the “Nash solution”, that corresponds to the standard Nash bargaining solution for surplus sharing problems and the Nash rationing solution (Mariotti and Villar in Int J Game Theory 33:367–377, 2005) for the case of rationing problems.
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Herrero, C., Villar, A. The rights egalitarian solution for NTU sharing problems. Int J Game Theory 39, 137–150 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0177-2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0177-2