International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 36, Issue 3, pp 393–407

Core-selecting package auctions

Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-007-0100-7

Cite this article as:
Day, R. & Milgrom, P. Int J Game Theory (2008) 36: 393. doi:10.1007/s00182-007-0100-7


Auctions that select core allocations with respect to reported values generate competitive levels of sales revenues at equilibrium and limit bidder incentives to use shills. Among core-selecting auctions, the ones that minimize seller revenues also maximize incentives for truthful reporting, produce the Vickrey outcome when that lies in the core and, in contrast to the Vickrey auction, and create no incentive for a seller to exclude qualified bidders. Core-selecting auctions are related to and share properties with stable matching mechanisms.


CoreStable matchingMarriage problemAuctionsCore-selecting auctionsMenu auctionsProxy auctionsPackage biddingCombinatorial biddingIncentivesTruncation strategies

JEL Classification Numbers


Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.School of BusinessUniversity of ConnecticutStorrsUSA
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsStanford UniversityStanfordUSA