International Journal of Game Theory

, 35:251

Communication and bargaining in the spatial model

Authors

    • Department of PoliticsPrinceton University
Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-006-0052-3

Cite this article as:
Meirowitz, A. Int J Game Theory (2007) 35: 251. doi:10.1007/s00182-006-0052-3

Abstract

This paper studies collective choice by participants possessing private information in policymaking institutions that involve cheap-talk communication and bargaining. The main result establishes a connection between the extent to which problems of this type posses fully-revealing equilibria that select policies in the full information majority rule core (when it is well-defined) and the extent to which a fictitious sender-receiver game possesses a fully revealing equilibria. This result allows us to extend Banks and Duggan’s (Am polit Sci Rev 94(1) 73–88, 2000) core equivalence results to the case of noisy policymaking environments with private information and communication when some combination of non exclusivity and preference alignment conditions are satisfied.

Copyright information

© Springer Verlag 2006