International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 35, Issue 2, pp 287–314

Strong and coalition-proof political equilibria under plurality and runoff rule

Authors

  • Matthias Messner
    • IGIERBocconi University
    • Department of EconomicsUniversity of Illinois
Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-006-0048-z

Cite this article as:
Messner, M. & Polborn, M.K. Int J Game Theory (2007) 35: 287. doi:10.1007/s00182-006-0048-z

Abstract

We analyze the effects of voter coordination on the equilibrium of voting games. Specifically, we analyze the concepts of strong equilibrium and coalition-proof equilibrium for plurality rule and runoff rule elections. We characterize these equilibria in the three candidate case, and provide results for important special cases in the general multicandidate case.

Keywords

Strategic votingRunoff rulePlurality ruleCoalition-proofnessCommunication

JEL Classification

D72
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Copyright information

© Springer Verlag 2006