International Journal of Game Theory

, 34:1

Median Stable Matching for College Admissions

Original Article

DOI: 10.1007/s00182-006-0009-6

Cite this article as:
Klaus, B. & Klijn, F. Int J Game Theory (2006) 34: 1. doi:10.1007/s00182-006-0009-6


We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.


MatchingCollege admissionsStabilityFairness

JEL Classification


Copyright information

© Springer Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsMaastricht UniversityMaastrichtThe Netherlands
  2. 2.Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC)Bellaterra (Barcelona)Spain