An axiomatization of minimal curb sets
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- Voorneveld, M., Kets, W. & Norde, H. Int J Game Theory (2005) 33: 479. doi:10.1007/s00182-005-0208-6
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Norde et al. [Games Econ. Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the literature on equilibrium selection in finite strategic games satisfying existence is consistent. A transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem: there is a multiplicity of consistent set-valued solution concepts that satisfy nonemptiness and recommend utility maximization in one-player games. The minimal curb sets of Basu and Weibull [Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141] constitute one such solution concept; this solution concept is axiomatized in this article.