Journal of Population Economics

, Volume 19, Issue 2, pp 367–389

A dynamic general equilibrium analysis of the political economy of public education

Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/s00148-005-0034-y

Cite this article as:
Soares, J. J Popul Econ (2006) 19: 367. doi:10.1007/s00148-005-0034-y

Abstract

The primary objective of this paper is to highlight the distinct roles of altruism and of self-interest in the political determination of a public education policy. I assess the relative importance of three factors in the determination of the equilibrium level of this policy: altruism, the impact of public funding of education on social security benefits, and its impact on factor prices. I then focus on the impact of implementing a social security system on the equilibrium levels of education funding and on welfare. I find that although in the benchmark economy, the presence of social security might generate support for public funding of education, its overall effect on the well-being of individuals is negative for any level of social security taxation.

Keywords

Public educationVotingGeneral equilibrium

JEL classification

D78E62I22

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsUniversity of DelawareNewarkUSA