AI & SOCIETY

, Volume 22, Issue 4, pp 523–537

Imagining a non-biological machine as a legal person

Original Article

DOI: 10.1007/s00146-007-0092-7

Cite this article as:
Calverley, D.J. AI & Soc (2008) 22: 523. doi:10.1007/s00146-007-0092-7

Abstract

As non-biological machines come to be designed in ways which exhibit characteristics comparable to human mental states, the manner in which the law treats these entities will become increasingly important both to designers and to society at large. The direct question will become whether, given certain attributes, a non-biological machine could ever be viewed as a “legal person.” In order to begin to understand the ramifications of this question, this paper starts by exploring the distinction between the related concepts of “human,” “person,” and “property.” Once it is understood that person in the legal sense can apply to a non-biological entity such as a corporation, the inquiry then goes on to examine the folk psychology view of intentionality and the concept of autonomy. The conclusion reached is that these two attributes can support the view that a non-biological machine, at least in theory, can be viewed as a legal person.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag London Limited 2007

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Center for Law, Science and Technology College of LawArizona State UniversityTempeUSA