Journal of Cryptology

, Volume 22, Issue 2, pp 161–188

A Proof of Security of Yao’s Protocol for Two-Party Computation

Authors

    • Department of Computer ScienceBar-Ilan University
  • Benny Pinkas
    • Department of Computer ScienceHaifa University
Article

DOI: 10.1007/s00145-008-9036-8

Cite this article as:
Lindell, Y. & Pinkas, B. J Cryptol (2009) 22: 161. doi:10.1007/s00145-008-9036-8

Abstract

In the mid 1980s, Yao presented a constant-round protocol for securely computing any two-party functionality in the presence of semi-honest adversaries (FOCS 1986). In this paper, we provide a complete description of Yao’s protocol, along with a rigorous proof of security. Despite the importance of Yao’s protocol to the theory of cryptography and in particular to the field of secure computation, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that an explicit proof of security has been published.

Keywords

Secure two-party computationSemi-honest adversariesYao’s two-party protocolProofs of security

Copyright information

© International Association for Cryptologic Research 2008