Acta Analytica

, Volume 22, Issue 1, pp 48–73

Armchair luck: Apriority, intellection and epistemic luck

Varia

DOI: 10.1007/BF02866210

Cite this article as:
Miščević, N. Acta Anal (2007) 22: 48. doi:10.1007/BF02866210

Abstract

The paper argues that there is such a thing as luck in acquisition of candidate apriori beliefs and knowledge, and that the possibility of luck in this “armchair” domain shows that definitions of believing by luck thatp offered in literature are inadequate, since they mostly rely on the possibility of it being the case that not-p. Whenp is necessary, such a definition should be supplemented by one pointing to variation in belief, not in the fact believed. Thus the paper suggests a focus upon the agent and her epistemic virtue in the account of epistemic luck in general.

Keywords

epistemic luck a priori knowledge virtue epistemology skepticism 

Copyright information

© Springer 2006

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of Philosophy Faculty of ArtsUniversity of MariborMariborSlovenia

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