Mind & Society

, Volume 2, Issue 2, pp 33–48

Models in science and mental models in scientists and nonscientists

Authors

  • William F. Brewer
    • Department of PsychologyUniversity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Articles Section on “Commonsense and Scientific Reasoning”

DOI: 10.1007/BF02512358

Cite this article as:
Brewer, W.F. Mind & Society (2001) 2: 33. doi:10.1007/BF02512358

Abstract

This paper examines the form of mental representation of scientific theories in scientists and nonscientists. It concludes that images and schemas are not the appropriate form of mental representation for scientific theories but that mental models and perceptual symbols do seem appropriate for representing physical/mechanical phenomena. These forms of mental representation are postulated to have an analogical relation with the world and it is this relationship that gives them strong explanatory power. It is argued that the construct of naïve theories as used in developmental psychology may be the appropriate form of mental representation for non physical/mechanical domains. The paper adopts a strong form of psychologism in the philosophy of science and argues that model-based approaches to scientific theories are more appropriate forms of representation for scientific theories than the formalist approaches that dominate current philosophy of science.

Keywords

Mental models scientific theories representation model-based theories perceptual symbols naïve theories formal models images schemas explanation

Copyright information

© Rosenberg & Sellier, Fondazione Rosselli 2001