Philosophia

, Volume 31, Issue 3, pp 345–354

An argument for the inconsistency of content externalism and epistemic internalism

  • Duncan Pritchard
  • Jesper Kallestrup
Article

DOI: 10.1007/BF02385190

Cite this article as:
Pritchard, D. & Kallestrup, J. Philosophia (2004) 31: 345. doi:10.1007/BF02385190

Copyright information

© Philosophia 2004

Authors and Affiliations

  • Duncan Pritchard
    • 1
    • 2
  • Jesper Kallestrup
    • 1
    • 2
  1. 1.University of StirlingStirlingScotland, UK
  2. 2.University of St. AndrewsSt. AndrewsScotland, UK