Crime, Law and Social Change

, Volume 26, Issue 1, pp 53–76

Criminalizing white-collar misconduct

Determinants of prosecution in savings and loan fraud cases


  • Robert Tillman
    • St. John's University
  • Kitty Calavita
    • University of California
  • Henry Pontell
    • University of California

DOI: 10.1007/BF02226104

Cite this article as:
Tillman, R., Calavita, K. & Pontell, H. Crime Law Soc Change (1996) 26: 53. doi:10.1007/BF02226104


In this article we examine three explanations for the differential treatment of white-collar offenders by the legal system: (1) an organizational advantage argument in which offenders in “organizationally shielded” positions receive more lenient treatment, (2) an alternative sanctions argument in which civil sanctions replace criminal sanctions in the response to white-collar crime, and (3) a system capacity argument in which the legal response to white-collar crime is driven primarily by resources and caseload pressures. These three theoretical arguments are tested through an analysis of data on individuals suspected of having committed serious crimes against savings and loan institutions in the 1980s. We seek to determine the factors that influenced prosecutors to file criminal charges against some of these suspects and not others. We conclude that all three models may be limited in their ability to explain low rates of prosecution in cases involving white-collar crimes of the sort examined here, and suggest that these limitations may have to do with the circumscribed levels of analysis at which these explanations have been pitched.

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997