Summary
In this paper we consider a two-sector economy in which individual unions are affiliated into a federation of unions. We analyze the consequences of two different types of wage setting. Firstly, individual unions set wages in their own sector without taking into account the effect of their wages on the employment level in the other sector. There may be positive as well as negative externalities. A positive (negative) externality may exist if a higher (lower) wage in one sector implies a higher level of employment in the other sector. Both cases may occur in our model. Secondly, wages in the two sectors are set by the federation of unions. We show that in this case higher (lower) wages result than in the first case if a positive (negative) externality exists.
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Jacobs, J., Janssen, M. Coordinating unions, wages and employment. De Economist 138, 321–339 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01857779
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01857779