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Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences

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Abstract

We prove that all nondictatorial voting schemes whose range has more than two alternatives will be manipulable, when their domain is restricted to the set of all continuous preferences over alternatives. Our result neither implies nor is implied by the original Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem, except if the number of alternatives is finite, when they coincide. A new, direct line of reasoning is used in the proof. It is presented in an introductory section, which may be useful in classroom situations.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Departament d'Economia i HistÒria EconÒmica, Universitat AutÒnoma de Barcelona, Spain

    S. Barberà

  2. Institut d'Anàlisi EconÒmica, CSIC, Spain

    S. Barberà

  3. Institute of Mathematics, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel

    B. Peleg

Authors
  1. S. Barberà
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  2. B. Peleg
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Additional information

The work of S. Barberà is partially supported by Research Grant PB 86-0613, from the Dirección General de la Investigación Científica y Técnica, Spanish Ministry of Education.

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Barberà, S., Peleg, B. Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences. Soc Choice Welfare 7, 31–38 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01832918

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01832918

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