International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 8, Issue 1, pp 55–61

The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences

  • K. Nakamura
Papers

DOI: 10.1007/BF01763051

Cite this article as:
Nakamura, K. Int J Game Theory (1979) 8: 55. doi:10.1007/BF01763051

Abstract

We consider a core of a simple game with ordinal preferences on a set of alternative outcomes Ω. When a player's strict preference relation takes any logically possible form of acyclic binary relation on Ω, necessary conditions for a simple game to have a nonempty core are given. If Ω is a finite set, the conditions are also sufficient. Further some related results are obtained.

Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1979

Authors and Affiliations

  • K. Nakamura
    • 1
  1. 1.Dept. of Humanities and Social SciencesTokyo Institute of TechnologyTokyoJapan