Cooperative games with large cores
- Dr. W. W. Sharkey
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A payoff vector in ann-person cooperative game is said to be acceptable if no coalition can improve upon it. The core of a game consists of all acceptable vectors which are feasible for the grand coalition. The core is said to be large if for every acceptable vectory there is a vectorx in the core withx⩽y. This paper examines the class of games with large cores.
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- Cooperative games with large cores
International Journal of Game Theory
Volume 11, Issue 3-4 , pp 175-182
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- 1. Bell Laboratories, 07974, Murray Hill, New Jersey, USA