International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 7, Issue 2, pp 73–80

Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

  • R. B. Myerson

DOI: 10.1007/BF01753236

Cite this article as:
Myerson, R.B. Int J Game Theory (1978) 7: 73. doi:10.1007/BF01753236


Selten's concept of perfect equilibrium for normal form games is reviewed, and a new concept of proper equilibrium is defined. It is shown that the proper equilibria form a nonempty subset of the perfect equilibria, which in turn form a subset of the Nash equilibria. An example is given to show that these inclusions may be strict.

Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1978

Authors and Affiliations

  • R. B. Myerson
    • 1
  1. 1.Graduate School of ManagementNorthwestern UniversityEvanstonUSA