Characterization of stable matchings as extreme points of a polytope Authors
Received: 17 April 1989 Revised: 14 May 1990 DOI:
Cite this article as: Rothblum, U.G. Mathematical Programming (1992) 54: 57. doi:10.1007/BF01586041
The purpose of this paper is to extend a modified version of a recent result of Vande Vate (1989) which characterizes stable matchings as the extreme points of a certain polytope. Our proofs are simpler and more transparent than those of Vande Vate.
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© The Mathematical Programming Society, Inc. 1992