International Journal of Game Theory

, Volume 18, Issue 1, pp 57–89

Lower equilibrium payoffs in two-player repeated games with non-observable actions

  • E. Lehrer
Article

DOI: 10.1007/BF01248496

Cite this article as:
Lehrer, E. Int J Game Theory (1989) 18: 57. doi:10.1007/BF01248496

Abstract

We characterize, by the one-shot game terms, the set of lower equilibrium payoffs of the undiscounted repeated game with non-observable actions.

Copyright information

© Physica-Verlag 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • E. Lehrer
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, J. L. Kellogg Graduate School of ManagementNorthwestern UniversityEvanstonUSA