Journal of Regulatory Economics

, Volume 5, Issue 2, pp 183–197

An optimal tax/subsidy for output and pollution control under asymmetric information in oligopoly markets

Authors

  • Jae-Cheol Kim
    • Department of Management and PolicyKorea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
  • Ki-Bok Chang
    • Department of Management and PolicyKorea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology
Article

DOI: 10.1007/BF01065365

Cite this article as:
Kim, J. & Chang, K. J Regul Econ (1993) 5: 183. doi:10.1007/BF01065365

Abstract

This paper constructs an optimal incentive tax/subsidy scheme in an oligopoly market with pollution, as a generalization of the Loeb-Magat scheme, which is nondiscriminatory and requires less information for implementation than the conventional ones. Some interesting properties of the scheme are discussed.

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1993