Political Behavior

, Volume 3, Issue 1, pp 49–68

Black electoral power, white resistance, and legislative behavior

Authors

  • Gary H. Brooks
    • Department of Political ScienceUniversity of Arkansas at Little Rock
  • William Claggett
    • Department of Political ScienceUniversity of Mississippi
Article

DOI: 10.1007/BF00989955

Cite this article as:
Brooks, G.H. & Claggett, W. Polit Behav (1981) 3: 49. doi:10.1007/BF00989955

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between black electoral power and white legislative behavior in Mississippi. The initial theoretical foundation is provided by the work of William R. Keech. Keech's implicit model is presented and a more elaborate model which views black payoffs as a function of black electoral power and white resistance, and the political generation of white legislators is developed and tested. A typology of electoral contexts is constructed, and the impact of such contexts on the relationships between the key variables is examined. The findings suggest that the processes responsible for the curvilinear relationship between black electoral power and black payoffs are more complex than previous research has implied and that the nature of electoral contexts may have a substantial influence on these processes.

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Copyright information

© Agathon Press, Inc. 1981