Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications

, Volume 11, Issue 6, pp 613–626

Additional aspects of the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games

  • M. Simaan
  • J. B. CruzJr.
Article

DOI: 10.1007/BF00935561

Cite this article as:
Simaan, M. & Cruz, J.B. J Optim Theory Appl (1973) 11: 613. doi:10.1007/BF00935561

Abstract

The Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games is a reasonable solution concept for games where, either due to lack of information on the part of one player about the performance function of the other, or due to different speeds in computing the strategies, or due to differences in size or strength, one player dominates the entire game by imposing a solution which is favorable to himself. This paper discusses some properties of this solution concept when the players use controls that are functions of the state variables of the game in addition to time. The difficulties in determining such controls are also pointed out. A simple two-stage finite state discrete game is used to illustrate these properties.

Copyright information

© Plenum Publishing Corporation 1973

Authors and Affiliations

  • M. Simaan
    • 1
  • J. B. CruzJr.
    • 1
  1. 1.Coordinated Science Laboratory and Department of Electrical EngineeringUniversity of IllinoisUrbana