Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications

, Volume 23, Issue 2, pp 277–284

Stabilization through taxation inn-person games

  • Y. K. Kwon
  • P. L. Yu
Contributed Papers

DOI: 10.1007/BF00933052

Cite this article as:
Kwon, Y.K. & Yu, P.L. J Optim Theory Appl (1977) 23: 277. doi:10.1007/BF00933052

Abstract

In formulating solutions forn-person cooperative games, the concept of stability has played a dominant role. Although the core concept has the strongest stability, the core of a game is often empty. In this paper, the taxation system is incorporated into our framework, so that a modified solution concept, which enjoys the stability of core, can be developed. Various formulations based on principles such astaxation proportional to income andequity after tax are given.

Key Words

n-person gamesstabilitygrand coalitiontaxation systemsnondominated imputationmulticriteria framework

Copyright information

© Plenum Publishing Corporation 1977

Authors and Affiliations

  • Y. K. Kwon
    • 1
  • P. L. Yu
    • 1
  1. 1.Graduate School of BusinessThe University of TexasAustin
  2. 2.School of BusinessUniversity of KansasLawrence