Environmental and Resource Economics

, Volume 4, Issue 1, pp 111–122

The biodiversity supergame

Authors

  • Scott Barrett
    • London Business SchoolSussex Place
    • Centre for Social and Economic Research on the Global EnvironmentUniversity College London
Article

DOI: 10.1007/BF00691935

Cite this article as:
Barrett, S. Environ Resource Econ (1994) 4: 111. doi:10.1007/BF00691935

Abstract

This paper considers the ability of developed countries to sustain a cooperative agreement to compensate developing countries for the “incremental costs” of biodiversity conservation. It is shown that, depending on certain parameter values and the model specification, such an agreement could only codify the non-cooperative outcome or achieve the full cooperative outcome where global net benefits are maximized. However, where the agreement can sustain the full cooperative outcome, net benefits will be only slightly larger than in the noncooperative outcome.

Key words

Biodiversityinternational agreementssupergamesrenegotiation-proofness

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1994