Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 1, Issue 4, pp 295–306

Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control

Authors

  • J. S. Banks
    • Division of Humanities and Social SciencesCalifornia Institute of Technology
Article

DOI: 10.1007/BF00649265

Cite this article as:
Banks, J.S. Soc Choice Welfare (1985) 1: 295. doi:10.1007/BF00649265

Abstract

Necessary and sufficient conditions for an alternative to be a sophisticated voting outcome under an amendment procedure are derived. The uncovered set, as first defined by Miller (1980), is shown to be potentially reducible, and conditions are determined for which this reduction equals the set of sophisticated voting outcomes. In addition, simple methods are given for calculating both the uncovered set and its reduction.

Copyright information

© Springer-Verlag 1985