, Volume 58, Issue 3, pp 325-363

Wittgenstein on following a rule

Purchase on Springer.com

$39.95 / €34.95 / £29.95*

Rent the article at a discount

Rent now

* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.

Get Access
This paper originated in an attempt to respond to Simon Blackburn's ‘Rule-Following and Moral Realism’, in Steven Holtzman and Christopher Leich (eds.), Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, Boston and Henley, 1981, pp. 163–187; I was stimulated also, in writing the first draft, by an unpublished paper of Blackburn's called ‘Rule-Following’. I have been greatly helped by comments on the first draft from Margaret Gilbert, Susan Hurley, Saul Kripke, David Lewis, Christopher Peacocke, Philip Pettit, David Wiggins, and Crispin Wright, who also kindly let me see a draft of his ‘Kripke's Wittgenstein’, a paper presented to the Seventh Wittgenstein Symposium at Kirchberg, Austria, in August 1982, and forthcoming in the Journal of Philosophy.