Environmental and Resource Economics

, Volume 8, Issue 1, pp 1–13

On International compensations for environmental stocks

  • Frank Stähler
Original Paper

DOI: 10.1007/BF00340650

Cite this article as:
Stähler, F. Environmental and Resource Economics (1996) 8: 1. doi:10.1007/BF00340650


This paper sheds some light on the possible implications of compensations which are paid for the maintenance of an environmental stock. It shows that serious complications can arise if the resource-owner may influence the compensation price strategically. If the incentive to raise the compensation price dominates the preservation incentive, the steady-state stock falls short from that which is voluntarily held. Whether compensation policies can neglect this feature depends crucially on the institutional setting which determines the compensation price.

Key words

international compensations strategic behaviour international environmental problems environmental stocks 

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996

Authors and Affiliations

  • Frank Stähler
    • 1
  1. 1.The Kiel Institute of World EconomicsKielGemany

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