Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 11, Issue 3, pp 287–310

Individuation and the semantics of demonstratives

Authors

  • Martin Davies
    • Birkbeck CollegeUniversity of London
Article

DOI: 10.1007/BF00293432

Cite this article as:
Davies, M. J Philos Logic (1982) 11: 287. doi:10.1007/BF00293432

Abstract

Obsessed by the cases where things go wrong, we pay too little attention to the vastly more numerous cases where they go right, and where it is perhaps easier to see that the descriptive content of the expression concerned is wholly at the service of this function [of identifying reference], a function which is complementary to that of predication and contains no element of predication in itself (Strawson [1974], p. 66).

An earlier version of the paper was written during an enjoyable year spent as a Research Fellow at the University of Melbourne.

Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Co. 1982