Erkenntnis

, Volume 32, Issue 3, pp 383–418

The ontological foundation of Russell's theory of modality

  • Jan Dejnozka
Article

DOI: 10.1007/BF00216469

Cite this article as:
Dejnozka, J. Erkenntnis (1990) 32: 383. doi:10.1007/BF00216469

Abstract

Prominent thinkers such as Kripke and Rescher hold that Russell has no modal logic, even that Russell was indisposed toward modal logic. In Part I, I show that Russell had a modal logic which he repeatedly described and that Russell repeatedly endorsed Leibniz's multiplicity of possible worlds. In Part II, I describe Russell's theory as having three ontological levels. In Part III, I describe six Parmenidean theories of being Russell held, including: literal in 1903; universal in 1912; timeless in 1914; transcendental in 1918–1948. The transcendental theory underlies the primary level of Russell's modal logic. In Part IV, I examine Rescher's view that Russell and modal logic did not mix.

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jan Dejnozka
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of the NavyUnited States Naval AcademyAnnapolisUSA