, Volume 7, Issue 1, pp 1-32

Definitions and properties of zero-knowledge proof systems

Rent the article at a discount

Rent now

* Final gross prices may vary according to local VAT.

Get Access

Abstract

In this paper we investigate some properties of zero-knowledge proofs, a notion introduced by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff. We introduce and classify two definitions of zero-knowledge: auxiliary-input zero-knowledge and blackbox-simulation zero-knowledge. We explain why auxiliary-input zero-knowledge is a definition more suitable for cryptographic applications than the original [GMR1] definition. In particular, we show that any protocol solely composed of subprotocols which are auxiliary-input zero-knowledge is itself auxiliary-input zero-knowledge. We show that blackbox-simulation zero-knowledge implies auxiliary-input zero-knowledge (which in turn implies the [GMR1] definition). We argue that all known zero-knowledge proofs are in fact blackbox-simulation zero-knowledge (i.e., we proved zero-knowledge using blackbox-simulation of the verifier). As a result, all known zero-knowledge proof systems are shown to be auxiliary-input zero-knowledge and can be used for cryptographic applications such as those in [GMW2].

We demonstrate the triviality of certain classes of zero-knowledge proof systems, in the sense that only languages in BPP have zero-knowledge proofs of these classes. In particular, we show that any language having a Las Vegas zero-knowledge proof system necessarily belongs to RP. We show that randomness of both the verifier and the prover, and nontriviality of the interaction are essential properties of (nontrivial) auxiliary-input zero-knowledge proofs.

Communicated by Shafi Goldwasser
This research was partially supported by the Fund for Basic Research Administered by the Israeli Academy of Sciences and Humanities. Preliminary versions of this work have appeared in [O1] and [O2].