Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies Authors
Received: 18 July 1990 Accepted: 15 February 1991 DOI:
Cite this article as: Zhou, L. Soc Choice Welfare (1991) 8: 247. doi:10.1007/BF00177662 Abstract
In this paper I prove that in the standard model of 2×n (n≧2) pure exchange economies there is no allocation mechanism that is efficient, non-inversely-dictatorial, and strategy-proof. This strengthens two previous results on this subject by Hurwicz and by Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin.
I thank Alvin Klevorick, William Thomson, and an anonymous referee of the journal for many helpful comments.
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