Social Choice and Welfare

, Volume 8, Issue 3, pp 247–254

Inefficiency of strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in pure exchange economies

Authors

  • Lin Zhou
    • Cowles FoundationYale University
Article

DOI: 10.1007/BF00177662

Cite this article as:
Zhou, L. Soc Choice Welfare (1991) 8: 247. doi:10.1007/BF00177662

Abstract

In this paper I prove that in the standard model of 2×n (n≧2) pure exchange economies there is no allocation mechanism that is efficient, non-inversely-dictatorial, and strategy-proof. This strengthens two previous results on this subject by Hurwicz and by Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin.

Copyright information

© Spring-Verlag 1991