The impact of different government units in the regulation of the workplace environment Article DOI:
Cite this article as: Marlow, M.L. Public Choice (1981) 37: 349. doi:10.1007/BF00138255 Abstract
This study examines the issue of whether or not state and federal job safety agencies provide the same levels of public output. Tests are conducted on the hypothesis that state takeover of regulation from the federal program serves to reduce the costs of firms. These costs are comprised of two components: the penalties for noncompliance and the uncertainty costs of regulation. The public policy implication that is drawn from these tests is that it matters to firms which government unit regulates them.
This paper has benefitted from the construcive comments of Joseph Cordes and Harry Watson.
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