Theory and Decision

, Volume 20, Issue 2, pp 155–172

Approval voting and strategy analysis: A Venetian example

Authors

  • Marji Lines
    • Facoltà di Economia e Commercio Ca FoscariUniversita Degli Studi di Venezia
Article

DOI: 10.1007/BF00135090

Cite this article as:
Lines, M. Theor Decis (1986) 20: 155. doi:10.1007/BF00135090

Abstract

The author presents a historic reconstruction of the single-member constituency election system known as approval voting which was used to elect Venetian dogi for over 500 years. An interesting procedure theoretically, concurrent approval voting is the only sincere single-winner election system. Central issues concerning strategy choice under uncertainty are investigated using a contingency-dependent framework of individual behavior given prior probability distributions over decision relevant propositions. Extensions are then proposed for the use of approval procedures in modern elections and other collective decision-making situations. Finally the advantages of trichotomous preferences in decision and strategy analysis are argued.

Copyright information

© D. Reidel Publishing Company 1986