Theory and Decision

, Volume 26, Issue 1, pp 47–79

Pavlov and the prisoner's dilemma

Authors

  • David Kraines
    • Department of MathematicsDuke University
    • Department of Mathematical SciencesMeredith College
  • Vivian Kraines
    • Department of MathematicsDuke University
    • Department of Mathematical SciencesMeredith College
Article

DOI: 10.1007/BF00134056

Cite this article as:
Kraines, D. & Kraines, V. Theor Decis (1989) 26: 47. doi:10.1007/BF00134056

Abstract

Our Pavlov learns by conditioned response, through rewards and punishments, to cooperate or defect. We analyze the behavior of an extended play Prisoner's Dilemma with Pavlov against various opponents and compute the time and cost to train Pavlov to cooperate. Among our results is that Pavlov and his clone would learn to cooperate more rapidly than if Pavlov played against the Tit for Tat strategy. This fact has implications for the evolution of cooperation.

Keywords

game theoryprisoner's dilemmaMarkov chainevolution of cooperation

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989