Theory and Decision

, Volume 32, Issue 1, pp 1–20

Evaluating Cooperative Game Theory in water resources

  • Ariel Dinar
  • Aharon Ratner
  • Dan Yaron
Article

DOI: 10.1007/BF00133625

Cite this article as:
Dinar, A., Ratner, A. & Yaron, D. Theor Decis (1992) 32: 1. doi:10.1007/BF00133625

Abstract

Two empirical applications of Cooperative Game Theory concerned with regional cooperation in the use of irrigation water are presented. Both studies attempt to derive income maximizing solutions for the participants and the related income allocation schemes. Distinction is made between transferable and non-transferable utility situations. The reasonableness and the acceptability of the schemes derived are later critically evaluated. Main findings are: (1) use of utility functions leads to problems in gains allocations, (2) the Core concept may be useless in this application because since it is either difficult to calculate or is empty in many cases, (3) gains allocation and the derived core are heavily dependent on probabilities of coalitions formation in the Shapley value or the Generalized Shapley Value.

Keywords

game theorytransferable utilitywater resourcesregional cooperation

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Ariel Dinar
    • 1
    • 2
  • Aharon Ratner
    • 3
  • Dan Yaron
    • 4
  1. 1.University of CaliforniaDavisUSA
  2. 2.USDA-ERSUSA
  3. 3.The Tel-Aviv College for Business AdministrationTel-AvivIsrael
  4. 4.Institute of Agricultural Economics, University of OxfordOxfordUK
  5. 5.Department of Agricultural EconomicsUniversity of CaliforniaDavisUSA