Chamberlain, G. and Rothschild, M. (1981) A Note on the Probability of Casting a Decisive Vote, Journal of Economic Theory, 25: 152–162.
Coughlin, P.J. (1982) Pareto Optimality of Policy Proposals with Probabilistic Voting, Public Choice, 39: 427–433.
(1983a) Davis-Hinich Conditions and Median Outcomes in Probabilistic Voting Models, Journal of Economic Theory, (forthcoming).
(1983b) Social Utility Functions for Strategic Decisions in Probabilistic Voting Models, Mathematical Social Sciences, 4: 275–292.
Coughlin, P.J. and Nitzan, S. (1981) Electoral Outcomes with Probabilistic Voting and Nash and Social Welfare Maxima, Journal of Public Economics, 15: 113–121.
DeGrazia, A. (1953) Mathematical Derivation of an Election System, Isis, 44: 42–51.
Downs, A. (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.
Ferejohn, J.A. and Fiorina, M.P. (1975) Closeness Counts Only in Horseshoes and Dancing, The American Political Science Review, 69: 920–925.
Ferejohn, J.A. and Fiorina, M.P. (1974) The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theoretic Analysis, The American Political Science Review, 63: 525–536.
Gale, D. and Nikaido, H. (1965) The Jacobian Matrix and Global Univalance of Mappings, Mathematische Annalen, 159.
Hinich, M. (1978) The Mean Versus the Median in Spatial Voting Games, Game Theory and Political Science, (ed.) Peter Ordeshook. New York: New York University Press.
(1977) Equilibrium in Spatial Voting: The Median Voter Result is an Artifact, Journal of Economic Theory, 16: 208–219.
, Ledyard, J., and Ordeshook, P. (1972) Non-Voting and the Existence of Equilibrium under Majority Rule, Journal of Economic Theory, 4: 144–153.
Kramer, G.H. (1977) A Dynamic Model of Political Equilibrium, Journal of Economic Theory, 16: 310–334.
Ledyard, J.O. (1981) The Paradox of Voting and Candidate Competition: A General Equilibrium Analysis, Essays in Contemporary Fields of Economics, Purdue Research Foundation, (eds.) George Horwich and James Quirk, 54–80.
Luce, R.D. (1959) Individual Choice Behavior: A Theoretical Analysis. New York: Wiley.
Luce, R.D. (1977) The Choice Axiom After Twenty Years, Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 15: 215–233.
McKelvey, R.D. and Ordeshook, P.C. (1982) Elections with Limited Information: A Fulfilled Expectations Model Using Contemporaneous Poll and Endorsement Data as Information Sources. Social Science Working Paper 434, California Institute of Technology and Carnegie-Mellon University.
(1982) Rational Expectation in Elections: Some Experimental Results Based on a Multidimensional Model, Public Choice, this issue.
Ordeshook, P.C. and Shepsle, K.A. (Editors) (1982) Political Equilibrium. Amsterdam: Kluwer-Nijhoff Publishing Company.
Palfrey, T.R. and Rosenthal, H. (1983) A Strategic Calculus of Voting, Public Choice, 41: 7–55.
Slutsky, S. (1975) Abstentions and Majority Equilibrium, Journal of Economic Theory, 11: 292–304.
Tullock, G. (1967) Towards a Mathematics of Politics. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.