Amacher, R.C., and Boyes, W.J. (1978). Cycles in senatorial voting behavior. Public Choice 33 (3): 5–13.
Barro, R.J. (Spring 1973). The control of politicians: An economic model. Public Choice 14: 19–42.
Kalt, J.P. (1981). The economics and politics of oil price regulation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kalt, J.P., and Zupan, M. (June 1984). Capture and ideology in economic theory of politics. American Economic Review
74 (3): 279–300.
Klein, B., and Leffler, K.B. (August 1981). The role of market forces in assuring contractual performance. Journal of Political Economy 89 (4): 615–641.
Kau, J.B., and Rubin, P.H. (October 1979). Self-interest, ideology and logrolling in congressional voting. Journal of Law and Economics 22: 365–385.
Lott, J.R. (1986a). Brand names and barriers to entry in political markets. Public Choice 51 (1): 87–92.
Lott, J.R. (1986b). Political cheating. Texas A&M Working Paper.
Lott, J.R. (1986c). Education, democracy, and the cost of government wealth transfers. Montana State University Working Paper.
Lott, J.R. (1986d). The institutional arrangement of public education: The puzzle of exclusive territories. Public Choice, forthcoming.
Lott, J.R. (1987). The effect of nontransferable property rights on the efficiency of political markets: Some evidence. Journal of Public Economics, forthcoming.
Nelson, P. (March/April 1970). Information and consumer behavior. Journal of Political Economy 78 (2): 311–329.
Nelson, P. (July/August 1974). Advertising as information. Journal of Political Economy 82 (4): 729–754.
Nelson, P. (August 1976). Political information. Journal of Law and Economics 19 (2): 315–336.
Peltzman, S. (April 1984). Constituent interest and congressional voting. Journal of Law and Economics 27 (1): 181–210.
Telser, L. (August 1976). Comment on political information. Journal of Law and Economics 19 (2): 337–340.
Telser, L. (January 1980). A theory of self-enforcing agreements. Journal of Business 22 (1): 27–44.