Constitutional Political Economy

, Volume 7, Issue 4, pp 303–308

Faustian bargains

Authors

  • Vincent Ostrom
    • Workshop in Political Theory & Policy AnalysisIndiana University
Articles

DOI: 10.1007/BF00119270

Cite this article as:
Ostrom, V. Constit Polit Econ (1996) 7: 303. doi:10.1007/BF00119270
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Abstract

Frank Vibert's Europe: A Constitution for the Millennium (1995) demonstrates the state of the art in constitutional economics applied to Europe on the eve of a new millennium. This paper complements Vibert's analysis by pursuing issues that address the constitution of societies as systems of order rather than confining our attention to systems of government. An attempt is made to affirm Vibert's prescriptions from different intellectual foundations than those grounded in economic reasoning narrowly construed.

Jel classification

D7H1Z1

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1996