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Explanation and understanding

An alternative to Strevens’ Depth

  • Original Paper in Philosophy of Science
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Abstract

Michael Strevens offers an account of causal explanation according to which explanatory practice is shaped by counterbalanced commitments to representing causal influence and abstracting away from overly specific details. In this paper, I challenge a key feature of that account. I argue that what Strevens calls explanatory frameworks figure prominently in explanatory practice because they actually improve explanations. This suggestion is simple but has far-reaching implications. It affects the status of explanations that cite multiply realizable properties; changes the explanatory role of causal factors with small effect; and undermines Strevens’ titular explanatory virtue, depth. This results in greater coherence with explanatory practice and accords with the emphasis that Strevens places on explanatory patterns. Ultimately, my suggestion preserves a tight connection between explanation and the creation of understanding by taking into account explanations’ role in communication.

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Notes

  1. Strictly speaking, this is dynamic contiguity, which Strevens claims is necessary but not always sufficient for causal contiguity. Nonetheless, it serves as his proxy for the requisite causal contiguity.

  2. For a discussion of the disjunction problem, see (Cover and Curd 1998, 786) and (Strevens 2009, §3.45).

  3. As discussed above, Strevens believes all high-level causal claims are in fact claims about high-level explanations, explanations that succeed in virtue of fundamental-level causal relations.

  4. This is similar to the approach to the disjunction problem that I suggest in Potochnik (2010b).

  5. See Potochnik (2010a) for an extended case study of this variation for evolutionary explanations.

  6. Communicative uses are generally deemed inessential to the nature of scientific explanations; the views of Bromberger (1966) and Achinstein (1983) are exceptions.

  7. Strevens does require that patterns of entanglement be cohesive, but in a different sense. A pattern of entanglement is cohesive “to the degree that there is a single reason for the entanglement” (2009, 255).

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Acknowledgements

Michael Strevens has given me a good deal of helpful feedback on these ideas and the paper itself. Alistair Isaac, Teru Miyake, Joel Velasco, and two anonymous referees also provided helpful comments on earlier drafts of the paper.

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  1. University of Cincinnati, P.O. Box 210374, Cincinnati, OH, 45221-0374, USA

    Angela Potochnik

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  1. Angela Potochnik
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Correspondence to Angela Potochnik.

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Potochnik, A. Explanation and understanding. Euro Jnl Phil Sci 1, 29–38 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-010-0002-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13194-010-0002-6

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