Abstract
In this paper, I examine an account of instrumental reasoning recently put forth by John Broome. His key suggestion is that anyone who engages in reasoning about his intentions also believes that he will do what he intends to do and that combined with a belief about necessary means this creates rational pressure towards believing that one will take the necessary means. I argue that Broome’s model has three significant problems; his key premise is false—the sincere expression of an intention does not entail the belief that one will successfully execute that intention; his account yields a model of instrumental reasoning that is uncomfortably reflective; he seems unable to explain the rational pressure towards taking necessary means that arises directly from having an end and an instrumental belief. All three problems, I argue, are a consequence of Broome’s inadequate position on what it is to intend to do something.
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Notes
Broome 2009.
Because Broome considers the instrumental principle a wide scope requirement, there are other ways of satisfying it (e.g., by abandoning the goal), but in 'The Unity of Reasoning' Broome focuses on this one. For more on the wide scope account of rational requirements; see, for example, Broome 2007; Schroeder 2004.
Broome 2009, pp. 65, 73, 78, 79.
Broome 2009, p. 64.
Broome 2009.
Broome 2009, p. 63.
It might seem odd to introduce a clause about whether it matters to me whether q. I take it that the reason why Broome does this is to avoid the implausible implication that I am rationally required to form all beliefs the truth of which follows from the truth of the beliefs I already have. This implication threatens because Broome here wants to talk about a positive pressure to start believing q, given that you already believe p and p→q and not just a weaker (wide scope) requirement to avoid combining the beliefs that p, that p→q and that ¬q.
Broome 2009, pp. 63, 66, 70, 80.
Broome refers to this as the modus ponens requirement. Broome 2009 p. 63.
Broome 2009 pp. 62, 63, 81.
Broome 2009, p. 72.
Hare 1952.
The expression of markers in standard spoken English is much more subtle and to do with the mood of the expression, according to Broome (Broome 2009). I shall not discuss the issue in any detail here.
Broome 2009, pp. 77, 79.
Broome 2009, p. 78.
Broome 2009, p. 78.
Broome 2009, p. 78.
Broome 2009, p. 79.
Broome 2009, p. 79.
Broome 2009, p. 79.
By saying that there is rational pressure on you to X, I mean to suggest that if you fail to do X, then the case for you being irrational becomes stronger. Whether you are in fact irrational for not doing X will depend on the circumstances and your other intentional states. For a helpful model on how exactly your intentions are to be weighed against each other, see Scanlon 2004, p. 235ff.
Broome 2009, pp. 75-80.
Harman 1999, 46-74.
Broome 2009, p. 80.
Broome 2009, p. 80.
This example is inspired by Bratman’s bookstore example in his 'Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical' paper presented at the Unity of Reason Conference at St. Andrews, June 2005. (That example is a version of another example of his in Bratman 1987, p. 37). My example, though, is stronger than either of Bratman’s, as I suggest that we might be able to believe that we intend to φ although we believe that we will in fact not φ. Bratman’s weaker point is the weaker negative one that when we believe that we intend to φ, we might not believe that we will φ.
Philip Stratton-Lake suggested to me that people who decide (once again) to quit smoking provide another example of people who truly intend to do something yet doubt that they will succeed. That seems very plausible to me.
It might seem paradoxical that I would do all of these things if I don’t believe that I will finish the paper. However, I believe that it is quite common to make commitments to help oneself achieve goals that one considers it unlikely that one will in fact achieve.
Of course, such future tense statements can also be used to express beliefs only. According to Broome, context alone will enable to listener to know whether you are expressing a belief or an intention (Broome 2009 p. 12). For an insightful discussion on the difference between intentions and predictions (and the expression of both), see Anscombe 1957, p 1-15.
One helpful way to understand why there are belief constraints on intending is to understand intending as a way of being settled on a plan. See, for example, Bratman 1987.
I sometimes reiterate to myself that I have a certain intention in order to increase the chance of my actually doing what I intend to do. But why would I ever do that if the fact that I believe that I intend to do something implies that I already believe that I will do what I intend to do? I wouldn’t. This again suggests that I can intend to φ, express this intention to myself and, contra Broome, still believe that chances are that I will not do it.
Importantly, this does not imply that I intend to X while believing that it is impossible that I will X or be absolutely certain that I will not X.
Broome 2009, p. 80.
Broome 2009, p. 68.
Broome 2009, pp. 64, 76.
Broome 2009, p. 80.
The way Broome formalizes his descriptions of practical reasoning supports my suggestion here. See, for example, Broome 2002.
I do not mean to suggest that Broome entirely overlooks the active practical essence of intending. Of course he talks of intending to do x and he talks of intending as ‘being set to make true’ (Broome 2002).What I mean to say is just that in his account of means-end reasoning, he downplays this active characteristic very significantly.
Broome 2009, p. 82.
Broome 2009, p. 77.
We remember that Broome admits that we can intend to ϕ, even if we do not believe that we have such an intention.
For another example of someone who believes that such early rational pressure exists, see, for example, Scanlon 2004, p. 243ff.
In this section, I suggest that Broome might have trouble once we introduce a distinction between not taking the means and not taking the means right now. As I see it, this is a distinction between not taking the necessary means and not taking the sufficient means (ϕ’ing at some point is necessary to achieve one’s goal - ϕ’ing right now is sufficient to achieve my goal). This section therefore might just as well have argued that Broome’s account has trouble dealing with sufficient rather than necessary means.
Broome 2009, pp. 67, 70, 80.
Or failing to have a (relevant to him) belief, the truth of which is implied by the truth of other beliefs that he has.
Spelling out exactly what it means to let a fact count in favor of acting in a certain way is of course not easy (nor, I believe, is it necessary for the point I am making). However, a helpful discussion on this can be found in Raz 2005.
This seems to be the answer that Broome would give, see Broome 2005, footnote 5.
With regards to the parallel issue about sufficient vs. necessary means, this answer from Broome amounts to saying that his model is meant to fit only cases where agents fail to take necessary means. Again this seems to limit the scope of his account very significantly.
Broome 2009, section 11.
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Acknowledgements
For their comments and helpful suggestions for this article, I would like to thank John Broome, Jonathan Dancy, David Dolby, Valerio Salvi, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen, Philip Stratton-Lake and Daniel Whiting.
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Høj, J.B. Problems for Broome’s Cognitivist Account of Instrumental Reasoning. Acta Anal 25, 299–316 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-009-0068-y
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-009-0068-y