Abstract
I present and defend a unified, non-reductive analysis of the a priori and a posteriori. It is a mistake to remove all epistemic conditions from the analysis of the a priori (as, for example, Alvin Goldman has recently suggested doing). We can keep epistemic conditions (like unrevisability) in the analysis as long as we insist that a priori and a posteriori justification admit of degrees. I recommend making the degree to which a belief’s justification is a priori or a posteriori solely dependent on the revisability relations that obtain among the faculties that deliver the belief and all other faculties.
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Fantl, J. An analysis of the a priori and a posteriori. Acta Anal 18, 43–69 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-003-1014-z
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s12136-003-1014-z