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A critique to the significance of Gettier counter-examples

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Frontiers of Philosophy in China

Abstract

Usually, people think that Gettier counter-examples challenged the traditional tripartite definition of knowledge and fundamentally changed the characteristic of the contemporary epistemology. This paper argues that regard for Gettier counter-examples is exaggerated, because (i) the JTB definition is neither an important nor a comprehensive one that covers all knowledge. Moreover, the significance of Gettier counter-examples is limited. (ii) The source of Gettier counter-examples lies in one arbitrary judgment, two mix-ups, three false assumptions, and a misunderstanding about the JTB definition.

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Correspondence to Cao Jianbo.

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__________

Translated from Fudan Xuebao 复旦学报 (Fudan Journal), 2004 (5)

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Cao, J. A critique to the significance of Gettier counter-examples. Front. Philos. China 1, 675–687 (2006). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11466-006-0031-6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11466-006-0031-6

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