Abstract
A principal challenge for a deflationary theory is to explain the value of truth: why we aim for true beliefs, abhor dishonesty, and so on. The problem arises because deflationism sees truth as a mere logical property and the truth predicate as serving primarily as a device of generalization. Paul Horwich, attempts to show how deflationism can account for the value of truth. Drawing on the work of J. L. Austin, I argue that his account, which focuses on belief, cannot adequately accommodate the complex role that truth plays in the norms governing assertion and similar speech acts.
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Notes
This is not quite correct. Strawson (1950) suggests uses of the truth predicate, e.g., as a device for signaling agreement, that are consistent with a deflationary treatment of the semantics of truth. This poses no threat to the Dummettian criticism discussed in the text.
In matches involving a series of games, players who are leading in wins may sometimes adopt a conservative strategy of playing not to lose. Nevertheless, this is still part of an overall strategy of winning the match.
Obviously, this account is too crude as it stands. See Horwich (1998a), pp. 44–46, for an outline of a more refined variant of the explanation of success.
See Horwich 2006, pp. 347–348.
This needn’t imply that lying is always wrong, since the norm against lying could sometimes be overridden by other norms; see below.
In “Truth” he seems to combine both ideas in saying that truth is either a “bare minimum or an illusory ideal” (1950, p. 130).
Warnock (1989) argues that Austin’s mistake is treating the illocutionary act as the proper locus of truth and falsity, whereas it is really the locutionary act which determines what was said in the utterance; cf. pp. 138–139.
References
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Hershfield, J. Missed It By That Much: Austin on Norms of Truth. Philosophia 40, 357–363 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9336-3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-011-9336-3