Skip to main content
Log in

Kuhn as Perspectival Realist

  • Published:
Topoi Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In this essay I argue that T. S. Kuhn, at least in his later works, can be regarded as a perspectival realist. This is a retrospective interpretation based mainly on the essays published posthumously under the title The Road Since Structure (Kuhn 2000). Among the strongest grounds for this interpretation is that Kuhn explicitly states that one must have a “lexicon” in place before raising questions about the truth or falsity of claims made using elements of the lexicon. This, in a linguistic framework, can be understood as an affirmation of perspectival realism. The essay concludes with an examination of Donald Davidson’s famous paper, “On The Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” arguing, along lines Kuhn himself suggested, that Davidson’s presentation is no threat to his notion of a conceptual scheme, or, I would add, a theoretical perspective.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. This volume also includes a transcript of an extensive autobiographical discussion that took place in Athens in 1995. I think these later works deserve more attention than they seem to have been given.

  2. For a short discussion of “perspectives and paradigms,” see Giere (2006, 82–84).

  3. That Kant’s position can be understood as a version of perspectivism is the theme of (Palmquist 1993).

  4. For an extended insightful examination of Kuhn’s lexical turn, see Hacking (1993).

  5. Thus, van Fraassen characterizes scientific realism as follows: Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true (1980, 8).

  6. I do not know whether Putnam himself, in his many publications, ever used the term “perspectival realism” (I rather doubt it), but internal realism has been publicly labeled as such by, for example, Simon Blackburn (1994).

  7. I have independently sketched a similar critique of the causal theory of reference (2006, 130, n. 37). See also Weisberg (2005).

  8. This is also Hacking’s (1993) conclusion.

References

  • Blackburn S (1994) Enchanting views. In: Clark P, Hale B (eds) Reading Putnam. Blackwell, Oxford, pp 12–30

    Google Scholar 

  • Boyd R (1979) Metaphor and theory change: What is ‘Metaphor’ a metaphor for? In: Ortony A (ed) Metaphor and thought. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Davidson D (1973) On the very idea of a conceptual scheme. Proc Addresses Am Philos Assoc 47:5–20

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Friedman M (1993) Remarks on the history of science and the history of philosophy. In: Horwich P (ed) World changes: Thomas Kuhn and the nature of science. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 37–54

    Google Scholar 

  • Giere RN (2006) Scientific perspectivism. University of Chicago Press, Chicago

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Hacking I (1993) Working in a new world: the taxonomic solution. In: Horwich P (ed) World changes: Thomas Kuhn and the nature of science. MIT Press, Cambridge, pp 275–310

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaufmann W (ed and trans) (1954) The portable Nietzsche. The Viking Press, New York

  • Kuhn TS (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. University of Chicago Press, Chicago

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuhn TS (2000) The Road Since Structure. In: Conant J, Haugeland J (eds) University of Chicago Press, Chicago

  • Palmquist SR (1993) Kant’s system of perspectives: an architectonic interpretation of the critical philosophy. University Press of America, Lanham

    Google Scholar 

  • Putnam H (1975) (ed) “How not to talk about meaning.” In: Mind, language and reality, Philosophical Papers, vol 2. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

  • Putnam H (1981) Reason, truth and history. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Quine WVO (1960) Word and object. MIT Press, Cambridge

    Google Scholar 

  • Weisberg M (2005) Water is not H2O. In: Baird D et al (eds) Philosophy of chemistry: synthesis of a new discipline. Springer, New York, pp 337–345

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgments

I would like to thank Rogier De Langhe for suggesting that I contribute a paper to his proposed collection celebrating the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Ronald N. Giere.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Giere, R.N. Kuhn as Perspectival Realist. Topoi 32, 53–57 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-012-9142-y

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-012-9142-y

Keywords

Navigation