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Deductive closure

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Abstract

This is a brief review of issues over which Henry Kyburg and I differed concerning the requirement that full beliefs should be closed under deductive consequence.

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Correspondence to Isaac Levi.

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Levi, I. Deductive closure. Synthese 186, 493–499 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-9996-3

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