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The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review

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Abstract

This paper provides an introductory review of the theory of judgment aggregation. It introduces the paradoxes of majority voting that originally motivated the field, explains several key results on the impossibility of propositionwise judgment aggregation, presents a pedagogical proof of one of those results, discusses escape routes from the impossibility and relates judgment aggregation to some other salient aggregation problems, such as preference aggregation, abstract aggregation and probability aggregation. The present illustrative rather than exhaustive review is intended to give readers who are new to the field of judgment aggregation a sense of this rapidly growing research area.

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  1. Departments of Government and Philosophy, London School of Economics, London, WC2A 2AE, UK

    Christian List

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Correspondence to Christian List.

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List, C. The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review. Synthese 187, 179–207 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0025-3

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-011-0025-3

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