Abstract
Richard Swinburne argues that belief is a necessary but not sufficient condition for faith, and he also argues that, while faith is voluntary, belief is involuntary. This essay is concerned with the tension arising from the involuntary aspect of faith, the Christian doctrine that human beings have an obligation to exercise faith, and the moral claim that people are only responsible for actions where they have the ability to do otherwise. Put more concisely, the problem concerns the coherence of the following claims: (1) one cannot have faith, (2) one has an obligation to have faith, and (3) ought implies can. To solve this dilemma, I offer three solutions that I believe have the philosophical resources to demonstrate the consistency of these claims. Thus, I defend the claim that it is logically possible for a person to be culpable for an involuntary failure to have faith in God.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Adams R. M. (1987) The virtue of faith. In: Adams R. M. (eds) The virtue of faith: And other essays in philosophical theology. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 9–24
Alston W. (1989) The deontological concept of epistemic justification. In: Alston W. (eds) Epistemic justification: Essays in the theory of knowledge. Cornell University Press, New York, pp 115–152
Craig W. L. (2000) No other name: A middle knowledge perspective on the exclusivity of salvation through Christ. In: Quinn P. L., Meeker K. (eds) The philosophical challenge of religious diversity. Oxford University Press, New York, pp 38–53
Craig W. L. (2001) Middle knowledge, truth makers, and the ‘grounding objection’. Faith and Philosophy 18: 337–352
Craig W. L. (2006) Ducking friendly fire: Davidson on the grounding objection. Philosophia Christi 8: 161–166
Engel P. (2000) Introduction: The varieties of belief and acceptance. In: Engel P. (eds) Believing and accepting. Kluwer, Norwell, pp 1–19
Erickson M. J. (2001) Christian theology, 2nd edn. Baker Books, Grand Rapids
Helm P. (2000) Faith with reason. Oxford University Press, New York
Hick J. (2004) An interpretation of religion: Human responses to the transcendent, 2nd edn. Yale University Press, New Heaven
James, W. (1956). The will to believe. In The will to believe: And other essays in popular philosophy. New York: Dover Publications.
Kinghorn K. (2005) The decision of faith: Can Christian beliefs be freely chosen?. T & T Clark International, New York
MacDonald S. (1993) Christian faith. In: Stump E. (eds) Reasoned faith: Essays in philosophical theology in honor of Norman Kretzmann. Cornell University Press, New York, pp 42–69
Moser P. K. (2002) Cognitive idolatry. In: Howard-Snyder D., Moser P. K. (eds) Divine hiddenness: New essays. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp 120–148
Moser P. K. (2008) The elusive god: Reorienting religious epistemology. Cambridge University Press, New York
Pascal, B. (1996). Penées (A. J. Krailsheimer, Trans.). New York: Penguin Putnam.
Plantinga A. (1974) The nature of necessity. Oxford University Press, New York
Russell B. (2004) The problems of philosophy. Barnes and Noble Inc, New York
Swinburne R. (1989) Responsibility and atonement. Oxford University Press, New York
Swinburne R. (2005) Faith and reason, 2nd edn. Oxford University Press, New York
Van Inwagen P. (1983) An essay on free will. Oxford University Press, New York
Yandell K. (1993) The epistemology of religious experience. Cambridge University Press, New York
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Corresponding author
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Hartman, R.J. Involuntary belief and the command to have faith. Int J Philos Relig 69, 181–192 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-010-9271-4
Received:
Accepted:
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-010-9271-4